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ALTERNATIVE RESTRICTIONS OF SEX
OFFENDERS’ SOCIAL MEDIA USE & THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Norah M. Sloss *

“The creation of the modern image of sexual offending owes much to the emergence
of a mass media that can tell its readers and viewers how to respond and make sense
of the deviant among us.” 1
—Terry Thomas

As technology advances, new mediums for communication of information
and networking continue to rapidly evolve. The evolution of social media and
social networking sites has increased society’s reliance on the Internet by enabling people to communicate and network with each other instantaneously. 2
Modern technology and heightened dependence on the Internet in our society
have created legal issues that courts have only begun to attempt to resolve
throughout recent decades. 3 However, as these issues become more complex
and more widespread, the law has failed to create viable solutions to combating
Internet crimes. 4
*
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1
TERRY THOMAS, THE REGISTRATION AND MONITORING OF SEX OFFENDERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 25 (2011) (noting that Terry Thomas is an Emeritus Professor of Criminal
Justice Studies at Leeds Metropolitan University in the United Kingdom and he has focused
his research on matters relating to sex offender registration and monitoring).
2
Jasmine Fowlkes, Viewpoint: Why Social Media Is Destroying Our Social Skills,
USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2012/10/11/opinionwhy-social-media-is-destroying-our-social-skills/.
3
STEPHEN T. HOLMES & RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES: PATTERNS AND BEHAVIOR
128 (2d ed. 2002).
4
Ulf Wolf, Cyber-Crime: Law Enforcement Must Keep Pace With Tech-Savvy Crimi-

111

112

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 24.1

Social networking sites such as MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn
have made communications between strangers instantaneous and recurrent. 5
Internet crimes, such as cyber-stalking, cyber-bullying, harassment, and solicitation, may be committed more easily through social media and social networking sites due to their anonymous nature. 6 In particular, the use of social
media and social networking sites make the commission of sex offenses, such
as solicitation of minors, possession and distribution of child pornography,
sexual harassment and abuse, and stalking, more problematic for law enforcement agencies to monitor and deter due to the high volume of internet communications occurring across national and international boundaries. 7
Despite a growing recognition of the problem, the number of online sexual
offense cases has continued to rise. 8 Perhaps more troubling is the fact that a
majority of these cases involve child pornography. Indeed, the number of cases
in which the Internet and communications technologies are used to sexually
solicit minors is increasing as well. 9 In an attempt to prevent sex crimes, various states have enacted legislation to ban sex offenders from using social networking sites. 10 Three such laws were challenged in federal court in Nebraska 11, Indiana 12, and Louisiana, 13 and ultimately were found to violate the First
Amendment.
This Note will examine how restrictions on sex offenders’ social media use
may violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment. Part I will discuss
the evolution of restrictions on sex offenders’ social media use. Part II will
evaluate the competing First Amendment issues of sex offenders’ rights to free
nals, GOVTECH.COM (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/Cyber-CrimeLaw-Enforcement-Must-Keep-Pace.html.
5
Susan Tardarnico, Is Social Media Sabotaging Real Communication?, FORBES:
LEADERSHIP
(Apr.
30,
2012,
8:52
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/susantardanico/2012/04/30/is-social-media-sabotaging-realcommunication.
6
Kimberly Mitchell et al., Use of Social Networking Sites in Online Sex Crimes
Against Minors: An Examination of National Incidence and Means of Utilization, 47 J. ADOLESC. HEALTH 183, 186 (2010).
7
Id.
8
MICHAEL C. SETO, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENDER
CHARACTERISTICS
AND
THE
RISK
TO
RE-OFFEND
1
(2012),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-andmeetings/20120215-16/Testimony_15_Seto.pdf.
9
Id.
10 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, RESTRICTION OR BAN OF SOCIAL NETWORKING USE FOR
SEX OFFENDERS COMPILATION 4-13 (2013) [hereinafter NDAA, RESTRICTION],
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/sex%20Offenders%20and%20Social%20.
11 Doe v. Nebraska (Doe I), 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Neb. 2012).
12 Doe v. Prosecutor (Doe II), 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013).
13 Doe v. Jindal (Doe III), 853 F.Supp.2d 596 (M.D.La. 2012).
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speech. Part II will also discuss how protecting children on social networking
sites is a compelling state interest. Part III will examine how federal and state
courts and legislatures have approached full and partial bans on sex offenders’
social media use in the past. Part IV will discuss recent legislation that aims to
provide a solution to the First Amendment issues raised in the past by imposing notice requirements on sex offenders’ social networking profiles and crime
specific restrictions on social media use. Part IV will argue that a blanket ban
on sex offenders’ social media use is unconstitutional; however, partial restrictions on social media use, such as those used in Louisiana, based on the
individual nature of one’s committed sex offense are appropriate and easier to
enforce. Additionally, imposing notice requirements on sex offenders’ social
media profiles is the functional equivalent of registering on a sex offender registry, which is already required by law and made available online, and is thus
not more restrictive than existing restrictions for many registered sex offenders. Part IV will argue that Louisiana’s revised statute, which defines the unlawful use of a social networking website, should serve as a model law for other states to adopt. Part V will conclude that legislation that restricts sex offenders’ social media use through the use of crime specific restrictions and notice
requirements on social networking sites are less restrictive than banning sex
offenders’ social media use. Such legislation should therefore be upheld by the
states to best monitor sex offenders’ activity and protect children on social
networking sites. Through analyzing the history and evolution of restrictions
on sex offenders’ social media use, this Note will demonstrate why Louisiana’s
revised statute should serve as a model for other states to adopt as the best alternative to bans on sex offenders’ social media use.
I. HISTORY OF RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS’ SOCIAL MEDIA
USE
The common restrictions placed on registered sex offenders have evolved to
reflect the changing nature of methods of predation by sex offenders.14 Sexual
offenses are particularly harmful and are serious crimes. 15 Sexual offenses are
often violent and intrusive experiences that invade the psychological and bodi-

14 Denise-Marie Ordway, Sex offender laws, registries and policy questions: Research
roundup,
JOURNALIST’S
RESOURCE
(Jul.
17,
2015),
http://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/criminal-justice/sex-offender-lawsregistries-and-gender-research-roundup.
15 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SEX OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING
FEDERAL
PENALTIES,
at
i
(1996),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/sexoffense-topics/199606-rtc-sex-crimes-against-children/199606_RtC_SCAC.pdf.
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ly integrity of the person assaulted. 16 These experiences are more harmful
when the victim of a sexual assault is a child who does not understand the significance of what is happening to them. 17
There are a variety of crimes that would cause a perpetrator to have to register as a sex offender, many of which involve crimes against children. Sex
crimes are often divided into those considered “non-contact” crimes and those
that involve contact. 18 Non-contact crimes include those offenders who possess or distribute child pornography, but have no actual contact with children. 19
Contact crimes are those involving actual contact with children such as solicitation, incest, and sexual assault. 20 Sex offender registration is based on laws
that require people convicted of certain sex offenses to keep in contact with
law enforcement authorities in order to notify them of any changes in their circumstances. 21 Registries were created due to the belief that many sex offenders
are likely to re-offend. 22 Through the use of sex offender registries, law enforcement agencies have access to improved data and are thus better equipped
to protect the public from future offenses in any given geographical area. 23
Through the act of registering, sex offenders are deterred and prevented from
re-offending as well. 24 The public can also access sex offender registries to
receive basic information about sex offenders living in their communities,
which enables individuals and families to take steps to protect themselves and
their children. 25
There are now over 500,000 registered sex offenders in the United States. 26
According to the U.S. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
“sex offenders pose an enormous challenge for policy makers: they evoke unparalleled fears among constituents; their offenses are associated with a great
risk of psychological harm; and most of their victims are children and youth.” 27
In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, which requires the states to imTHOMAS, supra note 1 at 2.
Id.
18 Id. at 3.
19 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 15.
20 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 3.
21 Id. at 1.
22 Id. at 48-49.
23 Id. at 1.
24 Id. at 3.
25 HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 112.
26 Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Department of Justice Activates National Sex Offend(July
20,
2005)
(available
at
er
Public
Registry
Website
http://www.amberalert.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/ojp_05_0720.htm).
27 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 2-3.
16
17
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plement their own sex offender registries. 28 The Act requires all states to have a
registry in place that records the names of those convicted of offenses against
children or a sexually violent offense. 29 If a state fails to comply, it loses 10
percent of its federal funding for crime control payable through local law enforcement assistance grants. 30
In 2006, Congress enacted the Federal Sex Offenders National Registration
Act (SORNA), 31 which mandates that sex offenders disclose the following information when they register with their state registry: address, employment
information, social security number, and other personal information for monitoring purposes. 32 SORNA was enacted with the aim of improving the quality
of state registries, creating more consistency among them, 33 and establishing a
floor for mandatory disclosures. The states may impose their own restrictions
on registered sex offenders in addition to federal requirements, but they must
meet the minimum requirements of SORNA. 34 Many states impose residency
restrictions on registered sex offenders that regulate how close a registered sex
offender may live or work in relation to schools or daycare centers. 35 Many
states also impose restrictions on contact with minors, 36 obtaining commercial
licenses, 37 alcohol and drug use, 38 and use of computers and the Internet. 39
In 2008, Congress enacted The Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act (the KIDS Act), which requires registered sex offenders to provide
their Internet identifiers to the authorities and notify them of any changes. 40 In
Alaska v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that “an imposition of restrictive
28 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (repealed 2009); see
also THOMAS, supra note 1 at 45 (noting that the Act was passed as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act, as a clear effort to enforce preventative measures).
29 § 170101(a)(1), 108 Stat. at 2038; THOMAS, supra note 1 at 46.
30 § 170101(f)(2)(A), 108 Stat. at 2042; THOMAS, supra note 1 at 45-46.
31 Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§
101-155, 120 Stat. 587, 590 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 et. seq. (2012)).
32 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION
26-33
(2015)
[hereinafter
DOJ,
GUIDELINES],
http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf.
33 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 50.
34 DOJ, GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 6.
35 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Get Answers About Sexual Abuse and Associated Risks, NAT’L
SEX
OFFENDER
PUB.
WEBSITE,
http://www.nsopw.gov/enUS/Education/CommonQuestions#answer-12, (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
36 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.30(1)(e) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.102(4)(b)(B)
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.17 (2015).
37 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ l4-208.l9A, 20-27.1, 20-37.14A.
38 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-5.2(C)(5) (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:561.5(5)
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b2)(9).
39 United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:561.5(16); GA. CODE ANN. §42-8-35(b)(3) (2015).
40 THOMAS, supra note 1 at 55.
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measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is ‘a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded.’” 41
Thus, many state restrictions on sex offenders’ activities have been upheld in
order to protect public safety, which is the key issue in evaluating the restrictive nature of bans on sex offenders’ social media use. 42 Therefore, it is necessary to examine the importance of social media to society by evaluating the
advantages and disadvantages of social media use.
A. Importance of Social Media Access
Access to social media is extremely important to society. Social media use
amongst young people is so widespread and frequent that it may even be considered essential for communication with others. 43 Facebook, the most popular
social networking website, 44 has 1.23 billion monthly active users, 945 million
mobile users, and 757 million daily users. 45 The primary use of social networking sites, such as Facebook, is to facilitate communication between people. 46
Through the use of instant and direct messaging on social networking sites, 47
constant interaction with others has become commonplace. 48
B. The Advantages of Social Media
However, there are many other useful aspects of social networking sites.
MySpace has become a common platform for musicians and bands to promote
Alaska v. Doe (Doe IV), 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003).
See id. at 85 (explaining that the Alaska Legislature’s intent was to protect the public
specifically from sex offenders); United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
43 AMANDA LENHART, PEW RES. CTR., TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA, & TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW
2015,
at
2
(2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/04/PI_TeensandTech_Update2015_0409151.pdf
(finding that 92 percent of teens use the internet daily).
44 Online Exposure: Social Networks, Mobile Phones, and Scams Can Threaten Your
Security, 76 CONSUMER REPTS., June 2011, at 29-33 [hereinafter Online Exposure],
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/june/electronicscomputers/state-of-the-net/facebook-concerns/index.htm.
45 Emil Protalinski, Facebook passes 1.23 billion monthly active users, 945 million
mobile users, and 757 million daily users, THE NEXT WEB (Jan. 29, 2014, 10:12 PM),
http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2014/01/29/facebook-passes-1-23-billion-monthly-activeusers-945-million-mobile-users-757-million-daily-users.
46 About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last
visited (Sept. 17, 2015).
47 MAEVE DUGGAN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2014, at 10 (2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/01/PI_SocialMediaUpdate20144.pdf.
48 Id.
41
42
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and share their music. 49 Twitter, the most popular “micro blogging” site, has
become extremely popular for public relations and advertising for both individuals and businesses. 50 Meanwhile, LinkedIn has become the primary method of professional networking online. 51 Social media has become a major platform for news collection and distribution as well. 52 During the 2012 presidential election, both President Obama and Mitt Romney used Facebook and Twitter as campaign tools. 53 Today, President Obama has 56.4 million twitter followers and has tweeted over 13,000 tweets. 54 Accordingly, social networking
sites have become a powerful tool for facilitating communication socially, politically, and personally. Restrictions on social media use thus place a limit on
the type and method of communication available to the public. The prevalence
of social media and the various useful aspects of social networking sites show
how restrictions on social media use can be prohibitive and restrict one’s ability to communicate and interact with others in a normal fashion.
C. The Dangers of Social Media
The legitimate uses of social media and social networking sites, such as
communicating with friends and family, professional networking, and accessing news, provide valuable benefits to those who use them. However, the public nature of social media and social networking sites does implicate public
safety risks, especially for minors. 55 The Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act (COPPA) 56, mandates that Facebook requires users to be over 13 years
49 Heather
McDonald, Promote Music on Myspace, ABOUT CAREERS,
http://musicians.about.com/od/musicpromotion/ht/myspacemusicpr.htm (last visited Sept.
26, 2015).
50 Paul Gil, What Exactly Is “Twitter?” What is “Tweeting?”, ABOUT TECH.,
http://netforbeginners.about.com/od/internet101/f/What-Exactly-Is-Twitter.htm (last visited
Sept. 26, 2015).
51 Dave
Roos,
How
LinkedIn
Works,
HOW
STUFF
WORKS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/social-networking/networks/linkedin.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2015).
52 Johnathan Hitz, Removing Disfavored Faces from Facebook: The Freedom of Speech
Implications of Banning Sex Offenders From Social Media, 89 IND. L.J. 1327, 1331-32
(2014).
53 LEE RAINIE & AARON SMITH, PEW RES. CTR., POLITICS ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
MAIN
FINDINGS
5
(2012),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/oldmedia//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_PoliticalLifeonSocialNetworkingSites.pdf.
54 Barack Obama (@BarackObama), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/barackobama, (last
visited Sept. 18, 2015).
55 CLAIRE LILLEY & RUTH BALL, NAT’L SOC. FOR THE PREV. OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN,
YOUNGER CHILDREN AND SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES: A BLIND SPOT 22 (2013),
http://www.nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/documents/research-reports/younger-children-socialnetworking-sites-report.pdf.
56 Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
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of age; yet in 2011, more than one third of Facebook users were younger than
13. 57 One million children were harassed, threatened, or subjected to other
forms of cyber-bullying on Facebook in 2011 as well. 58 A study conducted in
2006 by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children found that
approximately 13 percent of youth Internet users received unwanted sexual
solicitations online. 59
A similar survey of juvenile victims of Internet-initiated sex crimes found
that the majority of the victims met the predator willingly face-to-face and that
93 percent of those interactions involved sexual contact. 60 In 2010, a study in
the Journal of Adolescent Health reported that in 82 percent of online sex
crimes against minors, the offender used the victim’s social networking site to
gain information about the victim’s likes and dislikes. 61 The study also found
that in 62 percent of online sex crimes against minors, the offender used the
victim’s social networking site to gain home and school information about the
victim. 62 Social networking sites provide child sex offenders with a wide array
of people who share their sexual attraction to children as well. 63 Many child
sex offenders use social networking sites to share and trade child pornography,
chat with children, and establish personal connections with children in an attempt to locate children to abuse. 64 These findings demonstrate how sex offenders often use social networking sites to engage in sexual offenses, which
creates a serious risk for minors.
D. Bans on Sex Offenders’ Social Media Use
Due to the fact that online sex crimes against minors increasingly involve
the use of social media, numerous states have recently enacted restrictions on
sex offenders’ social media use in order to prevent further sexual abuse of minors through the use of social media. 65 Laws that attempted to entirely ban sex
(2012).
57 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1); Online Exposure, supra note 44, at 29-33.
58 Online Exposure, supra note 44, at 29-33.
59 JANIS WOLAK, DAVID FINKELHOR, & KIMBERLY MITCHELL, NAT’L CTR FOR MISSING &
EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 7 (2006),
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC167.pdf.
60 Janis Wolak, David Finkelhor, & Kimberly Mitchell, Internet Initiated Sex Crimes
Against Minors: Implications for Prevention Based on Findings From A National Study, 35
J. ADOLESC. HEALTH 424.e11, 424.e17 (2004).
61 Mitchell et al., supra note 6 at 185.
62 Id.
63 HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 129.
64 Id.
65 See generally NDAA, RESTRICTION, supra note 10, at 4-13 (stating that Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, South
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offenders’ social media use in Indiana 66, Nebraska 67, and Louisiana 68 were challenged in federal court and struck down.
The Indiana statute, passed in 2012, applied to sex offenders who were required to register for committing several enumerated offenses, many of which
involved crimes against children. 69 The statute banned registered sex offenders
from using all social networking websites, instant messaging programs, and
chat rooms. 70 The Louisiana statute, passed in 2011, applied to registered sex
offenders whom were convicted of indecent behavior with juveniles, pornography involving juveniles, computer-aided solicitation of a minor, or video
voyeurism. 71 The statute banned registered sex offenders from using and accessing all social networking sites, chat rooms and peer-to-peer networks. 72
The Nebraska statute, passed in 2010, applied to registered sex offenders who
committed one or more sex offenses involving a minor. 73 The statue banned
registered sex offenders from knowingly and intentionally using a social networking site, as well as any instant messaging or chat room service that allows
a person who is less than 18 years of age to access or use it. 74
All three of these statutes applied to similar offenders—those who committed sex offenses involving minors. 75 Additionally, each statute also banned registered sex offenders from using all social networking sites. 76 Each statute was
enacted with the purpose of protecting children from sexual predators online. 77
Yet, all three statutes were found unconstitutional in federal court due to First

Carolina, and Texas have adopted laws to prevent sex offenders from using social media).
66 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 694-695.
67 Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87.
68 Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 596.
69 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 696.
70 Id. at 695-696.
71 Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 599-600.
72 Id. at 599.
73 NEB. REV. ST. § 28-322.05(1)(a-k) (2010). The following offenses require registration:
(a) Kidnapping of a minor; (b) Sexual assault of a child in the first degree; (c)
Sexual assault of a child in the second or third degree; (d) Incest of a minor; (e)
Pandering of a minor; (f) Visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct of a child;
(g) Possessing any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct; (h) Criminal
child enticement; (i) Child enticement by means of an electronic communication
device; (j) Enticement by electronic communication; or (k) An attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned offenses.
Id.
74 Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1094.
75 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 696; Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1094; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at
599.
76 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 695; Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1093-94; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at
599.
77 Hitz, supra note 52, at 1327.
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Amendment violations. 78 Taken together, each case challenging these statutes
provides a solid framework for a constitutional analysis of the restrictions on
sex offenders’ social media use.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Several First Amendment issues arose in Doe v. Prosecutor 79, Doe v. Nebraska 80, and Doe v. Jindal 81 (collectively the “Doe cases”) that ultimately led
federal courts to find total bans on sex offenders’ social media use unconstitutional. This section will discuss the constitutional rights of convicted sex offenders and then examine how each case presented free speech issues. The discussion will then shift to how each court balanced free speech interests with
the compelling state interest of protecting children from sexual abuse online
and ultimately concluded that total bans on sex offenders’ social media use are
unconstitutional.
A. First Amendment Freedom of Speech
The Supreme Court has evaluated First Amendment challenges involving
free speech issues through various levels of scrutiny based on the nature of the
speech regulated. Such statutes regulating speech are thus deemed either a
“content based” or “content neutral” restriction on speech. 82 A statute is content-based if it regulates speech based on the content of the speech expressed. 83
In contrast, a statute is content-neutral if it regulates speech without reference
to the content of the speech. 84 For example, a law that regulates the sound amplification of a rock concert held within a public park is content-neutral because it does not regulate the content of the conveyed speech, it simply regulates the noise level of the expressed speech to protect the public interest. 85 A
law that prohibits offensive speech, such as wearing an item of clothing with
profanity on it, is not content neutral because it restricts speech based on the
words contained and the message conveyed, and therefore, would be subject to
heightened scrutiny. 86
78

607.
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Doe II, 705 F.3d at 703; Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1131; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at
Doe II, 705 F.3d at 697-98.
Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1107-08.
Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 603-04.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989).
Id. at 793-94.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971).
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The Court will apply a strict scrutiny analysis if a statute is content based.
Strict scrutiny requires the statute serve a compelling government interest, it is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest and it is the least restrictive means for
achieving that interest. 87 If the statute is content neutral, the Court will apply an
intermediate scrutiny analysis, which means the statute must serve a significant
governmental interest, must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and
must leave open ample alternative channels for communicating the information. 88 The court applies intermediate scrutiny when evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions on sex offenders’ First Amendment rights.
B. Limits on First Amendment Rights
1. Pell v. Procunier:
The Supreme Court has not specifically defined the First Amendment rights
of convicted sex offenders or other convicted felons. However, the Supreme
Court has specifically addressed the First Amendment rights of prisoners. 89 In
Pell v. Procunier, the Court notes that “a prison inmate retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” 90 Thus, prisoners are not denied their constitutional rights while imprisoned. However,
they may be denied certain liberties if the exercise thereof interferes with the
safety of the prison environment. 91 The Pell Court held that prisoners’ First
Amendment rights were not violated when they were not permitted to initiate
interviews with journalists. 92 The Court held that due to safety concerns involving face-to-face interviews and discipline issues within prisons, the restriction
on prisoners’ communications with journalists did not violate their First
Amendment rights. 93 The Court found that since such restrictions are normal
within a prison environment and the inmates are left with alternative channels
of communication, their freedom of speech is adequately protected. 94

Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 792.
Id.
89 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, it is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests).
90 Pell v. Procunier 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
91 Id. at 818.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 827.
94 Id. at 828.
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2. Beard v. Banks:
In Beard v. Banks, the Court reiterated the notion that, “imprisonment does
not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain important constitutional protections, including those of the First Amendment. But, at the same time the Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it
would allow elsewhere.” 95 Yet the Beard Court also held that certain prisoners,
who committed violent crimes and were held in the more secure level of the
prison, 96 were not deprived of their First Amendment rights when they were
denied access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs. 97 The
Court found the need to strictly monitor these prisoners and hold them in more
strict confinement due to their violent behavior in prison, which outweighed
First Amendment concerns. 98 The Court emphasized the other First Amendment rights available to the prisoners 99 and the reasonableness of the restriction
to maintain safety and promote better behavior among inmates. 100
C. Limits on First Amendment Rights for Registered Sex Offenders
The lower federal courts address the First Amendment rights of sex offenders’ in the Doe line of cases by analyzing the alternative channels of communication available to registered sex offenders if deprived of social media use and
by balancing their First Amendment rights with the compelling interest of protection children’s safety. 101 While the analysis of First Amendment rights of
prisoners informs the analysis of registered sex offenders’ First Amendment
rights, there is a crucial difference in the release status of prisoners and registered sex offenders. 102 Many registered sex offenders have already completed
their sentences and are released on probation, parole, or other forms of supervised release. 103 All registered sex offenders are already monitored by law enforcement through the act of registering as well. 104 Offenders receive greater
constitutional protection as the punishment for their crime moves along the

Beard v. Banks 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006).
Id. at 531-32.
97 Id. at 527.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 531.
100 Id.
101 Hitz, supra note 52, at 1347-48.
102 Id. at 1343.
103 Id. at 1335.
104 Sex Offender Registration and Failure to Register FAQs, U.S. DEP’T
http://www.smart.gov/faqs/faq_registration.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
95
96
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continuum from more liberty-intrusive to less liberty-intrusive. 105 Therefore, it
follows that the protection of registered sex offenders’ First Amendment rights
should be greater than that of prisoners. Many sex offenders have already
served prison sentences. 106 Thus, the act of registering as a sex offender serves
less of a punitive purpose and is less liberty-intrusive. It is up to the courts to
determine to what extent those rights can be restricted in the interest of public
safety.
D. First Amendment Right to Free Speech Analysis in Doe cases
As mentioned earlier, restrictions on free speech must be content neutral,
which means that restrictions must not discriminate on speech based on its
content. 107 Each Doe Court agreed that each statute banning sex offenders’ social media use was a content neutral restriction because it restricted speech
without reference to the expression’s conduct. 108 Content neutral restrictions
must satisfy intermediate scrutiny to be upheld as constitutional. 109 In other
words, states may regulate content neutral speech if the regulation is narrowly
tailored to serve a governmental interest and if the regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of information. 110 A regulation will
be found to be narrowly tailored if it does not substantially burden more speech
than necessary to serve its intended interest. 111 The Supreme Court has held,
“[a] statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the
exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy. A complete ban can be narrowly
tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil.” 112 In deciding whether bans on registered sex offenders’
social media use was a First Amendment violation, the Doe 113 Courts had to
first recognize social media use as protected speech under the First Amendment then analyze how restrictive banning such speech would be for registered
sex offenders.
Hitz, supra note 52, at 1342.
Jessica Ruane, Sex Offenders Have Shockingly Short Sentences, CRIMEWIRE (Oct. 12,
2012), http://www.instantcheckmate.com/crimewire/sex-offenders-have-shockingly-shortsentences/ (stating that most first time sex offenders get sentences of less than three years or
probation).
107 Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791.
108 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 698; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 605; Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at
1107.
109 Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791.
110 Id.
111 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 698.
112 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 475 (1988).
113 Doe II, 705 F.3d at 695; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 607; Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at
1095.
105
106
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1. Doe v. Prosecutor
In Doe v. Prosecutor, the Seventh Circuit found the Indiana statute clearly
violated the First Amendment right to free speech because it precludes expression through the medium of social media 114 and limits the right to receive information and ideas. 115 The Seventh Circuit noted that illicit communication is
only a subset of social network activity 116 and found that the Indiana statue was
not narrowly tailored because it was overly inclusive. 117 The statute was found
to be over inclusive because it banned sex offenders from all uses of social
media, rather than just solicitation of minors, and therefore targeted substantially more activity than the evil it sought to redress. 118
The Court also found the statute was not narrowly tailored because Indiana
had other ways of combating unwanted communication between minors and
sex offenders since solicitation of a minor is already a crime in Indiana that
serves the same purpose of protecting children. 119 The Seventh Circuit states,
“[a]n adequate alternative does not have to be the speaker’s first or best choice
. . . or one that provides the same audience or impact for the speech.” 120 The
Seventh Circuit found that although the Indiana statute was not narrowly tailored, it did leave open ample alternative channels of communication because
those affected by the statute still had various “old fashioned” methods of
communication available to them. 121 The Seventh Circuit ultimately found that
the statute was not likely to stop sex offenders from engaging in illegal activity
and that such a ban chills too much expressive conduct. 122
2. Doe v. Jindal
The court in Doe v. Jindal found the statute addressed protected speech under the First Amendment and aimed to promote a legitimate and compelling
state interest of protecting children. 123 However, the ban on social media use
unreasonably restricted uses of the Internet completely unrelated to the activities sought to be banned by the statute. 124 The statute not only banned the use
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Doe II, 705 F.3d at 697-98.
Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
Id. at 699.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 699.
Doe II, 705 F.3d at 701.
Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000).
Doe II, 705 F.3d at 700.
Id. at 701.
Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 604.
Id.
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of social networking sites, but also banned registered sex offenders from accessing social networking sites. 125 Thus, the court found the statute was unconstitutional because it was overbroad and not narrowly tailored to serve its’ goal
of protecting children from online predators. 126 Additionally, the court construed the statute to impose a sweeping ban on many commonly used websites,
such as news sites and blogs. 127 Therefore, the statute failed to leave open ample alternative channels for communication of information by banning access
to too many websites. The court found that this was problematic because it did
not address the goal of the statute and involved a greater intrusion on registered
sex offenders’ First Amendment rights than was reasonably necessary. 128 The
court also found it confusing for those seeking to comply with the statute since
it was unclear which specific websites they would be prohibited from accessing. 129
3. Doe v. Nebraska
The court in Doe v. Nebraska noted the Supreme Court has made clear that
First Amendment protections for speech extend fully to Internet communications as well as anonymous speech. 130 However, the court pointed to a flaw that
all three statutes had in common, 131 which was the bans did not “require a
showing that the offender poses a present threat to use . . . [social media] to get
at children,” 132 and therefore it was not narrowly tailored to target those offenders who pose a risk to children through the use, or threatened use, of
banned social media. 133 The court also pointed to how restricting social media
use affects one’s ability to read the news, video conference with family members, participate in political discussions, and network with professionals and
business associates. 134 Thus, the court concluded that in addition to failing the
narrowly tailored requirement, the Nebraska statute failed to leave open ample
alternative channels for communication. 135

Id.
Id. (explaining that a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of
its applications are unconstitutional).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 604.
130 Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1107; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); see
also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
131 Hitz, supra note 52, at 1351-56.
132 Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1111.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1109.
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4. Doe Courts Holding
Ultimately, the Doe courts held that banning sex offenders’ social media use
violates the First Amendment right to free speech and is therefore unconstitutional. 136 Such bans substantially burden more speech than is necessary to protect children from sex offenders and are therefore not narrowly tailored. 137
They also fail to leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
information due to society’s dependence on social media for many legitimate
activities unrelated to the goals of these statutes. 138 Therefore, in order to best
protect children from sexual predation online, the states have to develop viable
alternatives to banning sex offenders’ social media use.
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TOTAL BANS OF SEX
OFFENDERS’ SOCIAL MEDIA USE
The burden on free speech presents challenges to state legislatures to create
constitutionally permissible statutes that serve the purpose of protecting children from sex offenders while monitoring sex offenders’ social media use.
This Part will evaluate existing federal laws and various state statutes that aim
to protect children from sexual predators online through alternative approaches
to banning sex offenders’ social media use.
A. Federal Legislation: SORNA Amendment 42 U.S.C. §16915b (2012)
In 2008, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. §16915b, which amended SORNA.139
This statute allows the U.S. Attorney General to create an identification system
that allows social networking websites to check online identifiers that an Internet user establishes in online communities and websites with those online identifiers registered with the National Sex Offender Registry. 140 Upon receiving an
Internet identifier that matches a name on the National Sex Offender Registry,
the social networking site may ask the Attorney General to disclose certain
information related to the individual. 141 This information is limited to the indi-

Id. at 1119; Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 607; Doe II, 705 F.3d at 695.
Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1112; see also Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 607; see also Doe
II, 705 F.3d at 703.
138 Doe I, 898 F.Supp.2d at 1109; see also Doe III, 853 F.Supp.2d at 607; see also Doe
II, 705 F.3d at 699.
139 Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators (KIDS) Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-400, 122 Stat. 4224 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16915b (2012)).
140 Id. § 16915b(a).
141 Id. § 16915b(a)(2).
136
137
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vidual’s name, sex, resident address, photograph, and physical description. 142
Many social networking sites, such as Facebook, prohibit sex offenders from
using their websites. 143 However, these rules are incredibly difficult to enforce.
Many registered sex offenders who are on social media websites use Internet
identifiers that are different from their own names. 144 Therefore, using the verification system to compare information held on the National Sex Offender
Registry with these Internet identifiers is not helpful. 145 The federal checking
system allows social networking sites to obtain information from the Department of Justice only if they are focused on social interaction and their users
include a significant number of minors. 146 The statute clarifies the definition of
social networking site to mean:
[a]n internet website that allows users through the creation of web pages or profiles or
by other means, to provide information about themselves that is available to the public
or to other users; and that offers a mechanism for communication with other users
where such users are likely to include a substantial number of minors; and whose primary purpose is to facilitate online social interactions. 147

This definition of social networking sites demonstrates that by allowing social networking sites to access and compare Internet identifiers with those of
the national registry, the federal checking system’s purpose is to protect children from solicitation by sex offenders on social networking sites. 148
The federal checking system both provides the government and social networking sites with tools to monitor registered sex offenders’ social media activity, while it also limits monitoring so as to not infringe on sex offenders’
right to free speech. 149 However, the checking system holds social networking
sites and the government responsible for identifying those sex offenders who
are prohibited from using social networking sites rather than holding the offenders accountable for their own actions by forcing them to abide by legal
restrictions on their social media use. 150 Although the checking system established by 42 U.S.C. §16195b is a viable alternative to banning sex offenders’
who use social media, it does not proactively deter registered sex offenders’
Id. § 16915b(a).
Michael Martinez, New LA Law: Sex Offenders Must List Status on Facebook, Other
Social
Media,
CNN
(June
21,
2012,
12:49
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/20/tech/louisiana-sex-offenders-social-media/index.html (noting that Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities already bars sex offenders).
144 Joshua Rhett Miller, 16 percent of sex offenders nationally manipulate identities,
study finds, FOX NEWS (Jul. 25, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/25/16-percentsex-offenders-nationally-manipulate-identities-study-finds/.
145 See THOMAS, supra note 1, at 54-55.
146 42 U.S.C. § 16915b(b).
147 Id. § 16915a(e)(1).
148 SORNA § 101, 42 U.S.C. §16901.
149 KIDS Act § 3(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 16915b(c)(3).
150 See THOMAS, supra note 1, at 57.
142
143
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from using social media to harm children.
B. State Legislative Alternatives to Banning Social Media Use
Many state courts have recently struck down bans on sex offenders’ social
media on First Amendment grounds. 151 Statutes banning sex offenders’ social
media use in California, North Carolina, Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, and
many others have been challenged in state courts. 152 However, many other
states have amended their statutes to provide alternative restrictions to bans on
sex offenders’ social media use. 153 Many states have amended their statutes to
include restrictions on social media use as conditions of probation or parole
rather than prohibiting it overall. 154 For example, Minnesota, 155 South Carolina, 156 and Texas 157 statutes require that when a registered sex offender is released on probation or parole, the offender must be prohibited from using social media as a condition of his or her release. The Minnesota and Texas statutes further provide that upon the probation or parole officer’s discretion, this
condition may be modified if doing so does not jeopardize public safety 158 or
constitute an undue hardship on the individual offender. 159
The use of restrictions on sex offenders’ social media as a condition of probation or parole is a viable alternative to banning sex offenders’ social media
use. The Constitutional rights of probationers, parolees, and those on supervised release have not been fully defined by or addressed by the courts. 160
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that probationers and parolees
“do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” 161 Judges
and parole boards retain broad discretion in ordering conditions of probation

NDAA, RESTRICTION, supra note 10, at 1.
Dara Kerr, Sex offenders battle state courts for Facebook accounts, CNET (May 30,
2012, 8:56 PM) http://www.cnet.com/news/sex-offenders-battle-state-courts-for-facebookaccounts/.
153 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5(A)(1), amended by 2012 La. Acts 205; see also IND.
CODE § 35-42-4-12 (2015), amended by 2014 Ind. Acts 168.
154 Jasmine S. Wynton, Myspace, Yourspace, But Not Theirspace: The Constitutionality
of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Networking Sites, 60 DUKE L.J. 1859, 1867-69
(2011).
155 MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (2015).
156 S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-555(D) (2015).
157 TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 508.1861(b)(1)(A-B) (2015).
158 MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c).
159 TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 508.1861(c)(1).
160 See Wynton, supra note 154, at 1860.
161 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
151
152
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and parole, which are limited by sentencing guidelines. 162
Courts have upheld conditions of release that have implicated fundamental
rights. In United States v. Sines, the Seventh Circuit found that “[a] court may
impose conditions of supervised release which implicate fundamental rights so
long as those conditions are reasonably related to the ends of rehabilitation
and protection of the public from recidivism.” 163 Therefore, the courts have
broad discretion in imposing conditions of release on offenders as long as the
conditions could reasonably provide some sort of rehabilitation for the offender or prevent them from re-offending.
1. Recidivism of Sex Offenders
In order to create statutes and conditions of release that best protect children
by preventing sex offenders from re-offending, it is crucial to discuss the risk
of recidivism by sex offenders. Recidivism, the commission of a subsequent
offense, is often measured by subsequent arrest, subsequent conviction, or subsequent incarceration. 164 Policy specialists and social scientists have found that
sex offenders are more likely to reoffend than any other class of criminals. 165
Sex offenders are at a higher risk of reoffending when they become sexually
preoccupied, have access to victims, and fail to acknowledge their recidivism
risk. 166 Risk assessments of sex offenders often group sex offenders into high
risk, medium risk, and low risk offenders based on the seriousness of the offense and the level of culpability by the offender. 167
A study by Dr. Michael C. Seto found that many registered sex offenders
who commit online offenses, mostly involving child pornography, have either
an official record of prior sexual offenses or admitted to committing a prior
contact sexual offense. 168 Thus, it is likely that sex offenders who have committed contact sexual offenses, such as rape or sexual assault, will engage in
online sexual offending as well. 169 Dr. Seto explains that online child pornography offenders have a strong motivation to sexually offend against children
due to their sexual interest in children, but have more inhibitions about acting
on their motivations, and are therefore at a very high risk of re-offending
Wynton, supra note 154, at 1880.
United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2002).
164 Tim Bynum et al., Recidivism of Sex Offenders 2 (Ctr. for Sex Offender Mgmt.,
2001), http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.pdf.
165 Wynton, supra note 154, at 1895.
166 Bynum et al., supra note 164, at 12.
167 THOMAS, supra note 1, at 3.
168 SETO, supra note 8, at 2.
169 MAX TAYLOR & ETHEL QUAYLE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN INTERNET CRIME 74-75
(2003).
162
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through use of the Internet. 170 The circumstances surrounding the risk of recidivism for sex offenders, such as access to victims and the high risk of reoffending for online sexual offenders, clearly supports the need for states to
narrowly tailor their restrictions on sex offenders’ social media use. Restricting
registered sex offenders’ social media use as a condition of probation, parole,
or supervised release is reasonably related to rehabilitation and protection of
the public from recidivism for those offenders who used the Internet or social
media to commit a sex offense.
Therefore, statutes should not include limitations on social media use as a
condition of probation, parole, or supervised release, unless the sex offender
used the Internet to perpetuate his or her crime, which the Minnesota 171 and
Texas 172 statutes reflect. The New York statute 173 also reflects this methodology
and specifically addresses those offenders at risk of recidivism. The statute
applies to registered sex offenders who committed an offense against a minor,
are at greatest risk of re-offense, and used the Internet to facilitate commission
of a crime. Furthermore, it requires that offenders be prohibited from using the
Internet to access social networking sites as a mandatory condition of probation or conditional discharge. 174 This alternative approach of restricting sex
offenders’ social media use through conditions of probation, parole, and supervised release is more narrowly tailored to those offenders who committed sex
offenses through the use of social networking sites, yet is more effective in
protecting children for a period of time.
2. Limitations of Conditional Approach
The key issue with these statutes is that they only apply for a probationary
period, parole, or supervised release. 175 While this may be all that is necessary
to combat recidivism in some cases, it is less comforting to the public. 176 Furthermore, it still holds probation and parole officers responsible for monitoring
sex offenders’ social media use rather than the individual offender. 177 This creSETO, supra note 8, at 3.
MINN. STAT. §244.05(6)(c).
172 TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. §508.1861(a).
173 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4)(a-b) (2015).
174 Id.
175 Wynton, supra note 154, at 1869.
176 HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 223.
177 Emily Sweeney, Probation 2.0: How technology is changing probation work, BOSTON
GLOBE
(Nov.
29,
2012),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/south/2012/11/29/probation-howtechnology-changing-probation-work-probation-officers-tap-socialmedia/Qtv52cQffcVbkAsJqcg6lK/story.html.
170
171
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ates difficulty in enforcement since probation and parole officers are not able
to constantly monitor the physical actions of their offenders and would therefore undoubtedly struggle to monitor the social media activity of their offenders as well.
Although these statues are difficult to enforce, they provide an alternative to
total bans on sex offenders’ social media use through a narrowly tailored approach that is reasonably related to the rehabilitation of sex offenders and the
protection of children. Thus, other states can look to the Minnesota, Texas, and
New York statutes as models for restricting sex offenders’ social media use,
and amend their statutes to reflect a similar construction. However, these statutes should be improved upon to provide more permanent solutions. For example, if an offender violated a condition during probation, parole, or supervised release, or has demonstrated that he or she continues to pose a threat to
children, the appropriate sentencing authority should be able to impose restrictions on those offenders’ social media use as a condition of registration
following the end of their sentence, which would have a much more permanent
effect.
IV. SOLUTION OF MORE PERMANENT LEGISLATION
As previously addressed, some states have implemented statutes that ban sex
offenders’ social media use only for those offenders who have facilitated a sex
offense through use of the Internet or a social networking site as conditions of
probation, parole, and supervised release, which only protects the public from
recidivism for short periods of time. 178 This Part will address how states could
enact legislation specifically catered to different offenses, which would protect
children’s safety without infringing the free speech right of sex offenders to
partial access of social media. This Part will argue that Louisiana’s revised
statute defining unlawful use of a social networking site provides the best
means to restrict sex offenders’ use of social media within the confines of the
First Amendment. By doing so, the Louisiana statute serves as a model for other states to follow.
A. Legislation that Expands Notice Requirements
In addition to revising their existing statute, Louisiana enacted a new statute
in 2012 requiring registered sex offenders to include an indication that they are
a sex offender or child predator on their social network profiles. 179 The statute
also requires offenders to include notice of the crime for which they were con178
179

NDAA, RESTRICTION, supra note 10, at 1.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1(D)(1).
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victed, the jurisdiction of the conviction, a description of their physical characteristics, and their residential address. 180 Jeff Thompson, the Louisiana state
representative who sponsored the bill, said the new statute provides the same
notice to people “in whose home you are injecting yourself via the Internet.” 181
He explained he is not trying to create a ban on sex offenders’ social media
use, but is simply trying to create an expansion of existing notice requirements. 182 This alternative approach to bans on sex offenders’ social media use
is effective in protecting the safety of children because it provides notice to the
public of the presence of sex offenders whom are using social networking sites,
and gives the public an opportunity to avoid communication with them, if they
choose to do so. This approach also holds the individual offender accountable
for abiding by the restrictions, much like any other registration requirements.
1. Proposed Legislation: 2014 N.J. S.B. 140
New Jersey has recently proposed a bill modeled after the new Louisiana
statute. 183 The proposed legislation in New Jersey requires disclosure of the
fact that the individual is a sex offender and, “include[s] notice of the crime for
which he was convicted, the jurisdiction of the conviction, a description of his
physical characteristics, and his residential address.” 184 The proposed New Jersey legislation and the Louisiana statute are viable and effective alternatives to
bans on sex offenders’ social media use. They function very similarly to existing notice requirements imposed by state and national sex offender registries. 185
2. Compelled Speech
The Louisiana and New Jersey approaches are enforceable as conditions of
registration, and are thus permanently applicable. However, these laws may
face First Amendment challenges under the compelled speech doctrine. 186 The
Supreme Court has held, “[j]ust as the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the government
from compelling individuals to express certain views.” 187 By forcing registered
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Id.
Martinez, supra note 143 (statement of Louisiana State Rep. Jeff Thompson).
Id.
S. Res. 140, 216th Leg., 2014 Sess. (N.J. 2014).
Id.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2250 with LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1(D)(1).
See generally Wynton, supra note 154, at 1878-89.
United States v. United Foods Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001).
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sex offenders to provide notice of their status as a sex offender and disclose the
offense, jurisdiction of the offense, their physical characteristics, and their residential address, the government is compelling speech, but not compelling individuals to express a certain viewpoint. The Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR held
that compelled speech violations result from the fact that the “complaining
speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate.” 188 Consequently, the Louisiana and New Jersey statutes could be struck
down if a court finds that an individual sex offender’s own message is affected
by disclosing their status as a sex offender on their social media profiles.
However, this is unlikely because the notice requirements of the Louisiana
statute and the proposed bill in New Jersey do not express a message or viewpoint; they simply reiterate what is already publicly available information on
state and national sex offender registries online.189 The individual publication
of this information on one’s own social networking profile does not change the
analysis. These statutes are similar to those of many states that require registered sex offenders to post signs on their homes during Halloween. 190
For example, under Maryland law, the Maryland Division of Parole and
Probation provides registered sex offenders with signs that read, “NO CANDY,” and require them to post these signs in their windows during Halloween. 191 Since Halloween is a holiday that is almost exclusively celebrated by
children and their families, state legislatures have found it necessary to limit
sex offenders’ interactions with children by providing the public with extra
notice of sex offenders in their community through the sign. 192 The “NO
CANDY” signs do not explicitly state the registration information of individual sex offenders; however, Maryland is still expanding existing notice requirements for registered sex offenders by compelling them to post the signs in a
very recognizable and public manner.
Legislation that expands notice requirements of sex offender registration
laws, like that of Louisiana and New Jersey, are not more problematic. The
Louisiana statute and the proposed bill in New Jersey aim only to expand existing notice requirements of sex offender registries without expressing a message or viewpoint. Therefore, both should be permitted alternatives to bans of
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 49 (2006).
See S. Res. 140, 216th Leg., 2014 Sess. (N.J. 2014); see also LA. STAT. ANN. §
15:542.1(D)(1).
190 Cynthia Dizikes, No Halloween for Maryland’s sex offenders, L.A. TIMES, (Oct. 31,
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/31/nation/na-pumpkin31 (explaining that Indiana, Missouri, California, New Mexico, and Louisiana have enacted similar laws).
191 Peter Hermann, Sex Offenders and Halloween—They Don’t Mix, BALT. SUN, (Oct.
29,
2010,
1:10
PM),
http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/blog/2010/10/sex_offenders_and_halloween_t
h.html.
192 See generally id.
188
189
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sex offenders’ social media use throughout the states.
B. Legislation that Specifies by Offense
The aforementioned statutes that provide for bans on sex offenders’ social
media use during probation, parole, and supervised release specify that these
restrictions only apply to those sex offenders who committed specific offenses
against minors and those offenders who committed such an offense through the
use of the Internet. 193 These statutes would provide a more permanent alternative to bans on sex offenders’ social media use if they were conditions of registration rather than conditions of probation, parole, and supervised release.
1. Louisiana’s Revised Statute: LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2015).
The statute that most closely exemplifies this solution is Louisiana’s revised
statute. 194 Since Doe v. Jindal, Louisiana revised its statute to specify that unlawful use of a social networking site applies to “the intentional use of a social
networking website by person who is required to register as a sex offender and
who was convicted of indecent behavior with juveniles, pornography involving
juveniles, computer-aided solicitation of a minor, or video voyeurism.” 195 The
revised statute also applies to those offenders who were convicted of various
aggravated offenses in which the victim was a minor. 196
a. Enforceability
Louisiana’s revised statute is more narrowly tailored and applies permanently to those registered sex offenders who are at risk of re-offending through the
use of social media by only restricting the amount of speech that is necessary
to protect the state’s intended interest, children’s safety. The statute states:
(2)(a) “Social networking website” means an Internet website, the primary purpose of
which is facilitating social interaction with other users of the website and has all of the
following capabilities: (i) [a]llows users to create web pages or profiles about themselves that are available to the general public or to any other users. (ii) Offers a mechanism for communication among users. (b) “Social networking website” shall not include any of the following: (i) [a]n Internet website that provides only one of the following services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, or instant messaging. (ii) An Internet
website the primary purpose of which is the facilitation of commercial transactions
193 MINN. STAT. §244.05; TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. §508.1861; N.Y. PENAL LAW §
65.10(4)(a-b).
194 See generally LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5.
195 Id.
196 Id. § 15:541.
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involving goods or services between its members or visitors. (iii) An Internet website
the primary purpose of which is the dissemination of news…. 197

Louisiana’s Revised Statute is also more enforceable than the conditions of
probation, parole, and supervised release because it holds the individual offenders accountable for their own actions. 198 By restricting social media use of
those sex offenders’ who facilitated their offenses through the Internet or social
media, like any other condition of initial registration as a sex offender, Louisiana can ensure that those specific sex offenders may be rehabilitated and that
the public will be protected from their possible recidivism.
2. Ample Alternative Channels of Communication
There may be some concerns that Louisiana’s revised statute does not leave
open ample alternative means for communication for those sex offenders that it
applies to. The courts would need to explicitly address and clarify this issue to
determine whether or not social media is such an invaluable method of communication that banning its use would not leave open ample alternative channels for communication of information. 199 However, as the court in Doe v.
Prosecutor found, deprivation of social media use does leave open ample alternative methods of old-fashioned communication. 200 Furthermore, the restrictions on social media use in Louisiana’s revised statute do not apply to
websites that provide only photo sharing, electronic mail, or instant messaging,
primarily facilitate commercial transactions involving goods and services between its’ members or visitors, primarily disseminate news, and belong to a
government entity. 201 Therefore, under the revised statute, while registered sex
offenders may be restricted from using Facebook 202 or Twitter 203, they would
still be able to access Gmail 204, Amazon 205, Netflix 206, CNN 207, and many other
websites that provide services unrelated to social networking with children.
Louisiana’s revised statute only prohibits the use of social networking sites that
are primarily used for facilitating social interaction. 208 Therefore, it is not likely
to be found too restrictive for failing to leave open ample alternative channels
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Id. § 14:91.5(B)(2)(a).
Id. § 14:91.5.
See Hitz, supra note 52, at 1356-58.
Doe II, 705 F.3d at 696-99, 703.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5B(2)(b).
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
TWITTER, https://www.twitter.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
GMAIL, https://www.mail.google.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
AMAZON, www.amazon.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
CNN, www.cnn.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5B(2)(a).
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of communication, which makes it more effective at targeting the activity the
statute seeks to prohibit.
C. Louisiana Revised Statute Provides Model Solution
Although Louisiana and New Jersey’s notice oriented statutes do provide a
viable alternative to banning sex offenders’ social media use, they are more
difficult to enforce. 209 The revised Louisiana statute that specifies unlawful use
of a social networking website based on the crime committed by each individual sex offender is less restrictive and more enforceable than a total ban on
every registered sex offenders’ social media use. 210 This statute serves as a
model for other states to look towards in constructing their own restrictions on
registered sex offenders’ social media use because it specifies exactly which
sex offenses the statute applies to, which types of social networking use is prohibited, and what the consequences are for offenders whom do not comply
with the statute. 211
The revised Louisiana statute restricts social media use of those offenders
who have been convicted of indecent behavior with juveniles, pornography
involving juveniles, computer-aided solicitation of a minor, or video voyeurism. 212 These specific sex offenses all involve harm to children. Thus, preventing offenders who have been convicted of these crimes protects both offenders
and the public against recidivism and ultimately protects children from sexual
predation. 213 This statute also specifies which types of social networking sites
sex offenders are prohibited from using. 214 Furthermore, the statute specifies
that “unlawful use” of a social networking website means to “create a profile
on a social networking website or to contact or attempt to contact other users
of the social networking website.” 215 The statute makes very clear to whom the
statute applies and what activity is restricted. Moreover, it also clearly defines
the consequences for failing to comply with the statute:
Whoever commits the crime of unlawful use of a social networking website
shall, upon a first conviction, be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and
shall be imprisoned with hard labor for not more than ten years without benefit
of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Whoever commits the crime of
unlawful use of a social networking website, upon a second or subsequent con209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Martinez, supra note 143.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5A(1).
Id. § 14:91.5.
Id. § 14:91.5A(1).
HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 130.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5B(2)(a).
Id. § 14:91.5B(3).
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viction, shall be fined not more than twenty thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned with hard labor for not less than five years nor more than twenty
years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. 216
Thus, Louisiana’s revised statute provides notice of the consequences for
failing to comply for registered sex offenders and ultimately protects the public
from recidivism. 217 This statute is also much less restrictive on the freedom of
speech and a better alternative to banning social media use for all registered
sex offenders. 218 Furthermore, it is a more enforceable and permanent solution
because the statute automatically applies to registered sex offenders upon conviction of one of the enumerated offenses rather than on an individual basis
during probation or parole. 219 The specifications of the statute also make it
much more feasible for law enforcement to identify which offenders the statute
applies to and what activity is prohibited. 220 Thus, the revised Louisiana statute
should serve as a model for other states to adopt in order to restrict registered
sex offenders’ social media use in a manner that is less restrictive on free
speech and best protects children from online sexual predation.
V. CONCLUSION
As technology continuously advances, society’s dependence on the Internet
and younger generations’ use of social media will continue to increase. Thus,
the protection of children online has undeniably become a compelling state
interest. States must incorporate and enforce laws that protect social interaction
online to ensure the safety of children. However, these laws cannot deprive
individuals of their constitutional liberties. Complete bans on registered sex
offenders’ social media use deprive them of their right to free speech and are
therefore unconstitutional.
As an alternative to such bans, the states should implement more narrowly
tailored restrictions of sex offenders’ social media use that specifically apply to
those whom actually facilitated a sex offense through the use of the Internet or
social media. The states can look to recent changes in sex offender registration
laws throughout the country that emphasize the importance of offensive specific language, and the expansion of notice requirements to create effective and
enforceable laws that provide rehabilitation for offenders and protection for the
public. The states should specifically look to the revised Louisiana statute that
defines unlawful use of a social networking website by registered sex offenders
Id. § 14:91.5(C).
Id.; HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 3 at 130.
218 Eva Conner, Why Don’t You Take A Seat Away From That Computer?: Why Louisiana Statute 14:91:5 is Unconstitutional, 73 LA. L. REV. 883, 884-85 (2013).
219 Wynton, supra note 154, at 1867.
220 LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:91.5(A)(1), (B)(2)(a).
216
217
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as a model. The revised Louisiana statute provides a clearly enforceable and
permanent alternative to banning sex offenders’ social media use and furthers
the compelling interest of protecting children.

